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In looking at the interagency decision process, the DEOMI manpower reduction testifies to Jervis's hypothesis that "Actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned." 1 Further, these events exemplify Bolman's and Deal's assertions that "Scarce resources and enduring differences give conflict a central role in organizational dynamics and make power the most important resource;" and "Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among different stakeholders." Over the years, the Institute took on a wide range of equal opportunity training and research tasks to meet the needs of field commanders and agency heads. As a result, the Institute now addresses a wide array of issues, including sexual harassment, sexism, extremism, religious accommodations, and anti-Semitism. Because of this growth, the Institute changed its name to DEOMI 
THE ASAF (M&RA) TAKES A STAND AND DIRECTS THE SOLUTION:
Finally, after growing tired of bickering between personnel in the AF manpower DCS, AF DCS amendment process, they perceived the manpower study and its suggested manpower requirements for each Service as sufficient justification for the AF cut. Some AF DCS (P) action officers, in hindsight, now admit they too readily adopted the manpower study as justification for the reduction. After all, the study was not an authoritative document for manpower reductions.
As described by AF DCS (P) and Air Staff manpower officers, the senior AF DCS (P) leadership quickly adopted the budget action officers' proposed reduction in large part because of the continuous pressure for cost savings to bring AF personnel programs within budget. The intense drive to save tight budget dollars was not the only cultural factor that led to the DEOMI reduction. Within AF DCS (P), the EO function is one of the least valued personnel programs, as it has been for many years from the author's perspective as a career personnel officer. Staff personnel may not publicly admit it, but in budget drills to save or find money, any Service rather than the Army. The ASAF (M&RA) saw the AF DCS (P) efforts to pass the buck to Army as politically unacceptable. The Army DCS (P) culture matched the AF DCS (P)
budgeting office culture in that the overriding concern was cost avoidance. The Army DCS (P) players wanted to keep the cost outside of the Army's budget more than they wanted to be team players in any fair share distribution of manpower. 
AF DCS (P) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

